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 1 . Introduction 
t is becoming increasingly apparent that, in order to escape the 
fetters imposed by the narrowed neoclassical paradigm, the 
economics of growth and development must welcome, or at least 
accept, the input of related disciplines, be they, History, Sociology, 
Anthropology, or Political Sciences.1This is not an easy pill to shalow for 
those trained in the rigors of the current received wisdom, but to the 
growth theorist, it is necessary medecine. It is clear that much of the 
theorizing on growth is missing something important. And that 
something may be, venturing out on a limb, culture. 
 
    The view that cultural factors are an important determinant of 
economic performance is as old as the hills. One need only recall that 
many years ago , the dominant view regarding the origins of the 
Industrial Revolution was the so-called “ Protestant work ethic, ” as 
documented in the work of Tawney, Max Weber , and others.2But there 
has been a tendency in much theoretical work to ignore cultural factors 
as a determinant of growth performace. Fortunately, there are a number 
o frecent exceptions. 
 
       The recent literatue dealing with endogenous growth has shown, in 
a number of contexts, that the equilibrium growth rate of an economy 
                                                 
1
 On the difficulties involved for development economists with associating with the other social sciences see the 
humouous but accurate account by Leijonhufvud (1973). 
2
 The list goes on ans on, viz. Comte, Marx, Spencer, Taylor, morgan, Durkheim, etc 
I 
under command optimum is usually greater that that under 
decentralized competitive equilibrium, and this because of the 
externalities wichi lie at the base of the growth process, and which may 
be internalized by the governmet intervention. Recently, the literature 
has turned its attention towards socio-cultural attributes which 
mayprovide important clues in explaining differences in growth 
performance. Baumon(1990), for example, stresses the role of the social 
prestige associated with rent seeking as opposed to productive 
activities.Acemoglu (1993) considers the endogenisation o fremuneration 
structures in which the allocation of talent in the past affects the present 
structure of remuneration. He shows how this path dependance may 
lead to a low level of development trap. Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite 
(1993) construct a model in which social status is integrated into the 
marriage decision, thus affecting the accumulation of wealth. Fershtman 
and Weiss (1991) examine the impact of the demand of social status on 
growth , and show that an increase in the demand for the social status 
may reduce growth in the case of cultures which place greater weight on 
symbolic status than on  productive status.  
 
       The upshot of this recent literature which seeks to incorporate socio-
cultural elements into models of economic growth is that these issues 
may have an important role to play in determining growth in as much as 
they constitute mechanisms with important economic consequences, 
particularly with respect to saving behavior .The purpose of this paper is 
to to introduce, a social incentive with respect to accumulation versus 
consumption into a simple model of economic growth. 
 
     2. The Model 
       Consider an economy characterized by perfect competition and a 
large number of identical agents who choose an intertemporal 
consumption profile which maximizes the following additively 
separable utility funtion: 
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,,0 dtetctkAtcuU t                                                (1) 
  
where   is the discount rate,  tc is consumption in period t , and 
    tctkA ,  represents her social standing, and where we assume that : 
0,0 
Ac
uu . An individual’s social standing A(.) is assumed to be a 
function of her accumulated capital as well as of her consumption. For 
simplicity in exposition, assume the following functional forms: 
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  Assume that the output is given by the following technology : 
   0'',0' ,          fftkfy  
 
  Whence we can write the law of  motion of capital accumulation as: 
        tktctkftk                                                                  (4) 
where ,1  is the depreciation rate. The individual’s optimization 
problem can therefore be written as: 
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One can therefore present our first result as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 
 Given the socio-cultural preferences the growth rate is : 
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  is the elasticity of social status with respect to 
capital . ” 
 
Proof: 
The within period utility function of the individual can be rewritten as : 
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while the law of motion of capital can be solved for consumption to yield 
: 
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We can therefore transform the optimal control problem into a 
variational problem, which leads to the following Euler Equation: 
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Imposing the balanced growth cndition: 
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and denoting the elasticity of social standing with respect to capital as : 
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allows one to rewrite the Euler equation as: 
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whence, solving for g, we obtain : 
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Our main result is summarized by the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 1 
 Societies with socio-cultural preference attaching greater weight to 
productive versus consumption status will display a higher growth rate : 
  0' g                                                                         . 
 
Proof: 
By simple derivation: 
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3. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have shown that social incentives which place more 
weight on capital accumulation than on consumption result, ceteris 
paribus,in a higher rate of growth through their effect on capital 
accumulation. Our results are broadly consistent with those of 
Baumol(1990) and Ferschtman and Weiss (1991), and they provide an 
illustration of how Karl Marx, Max Weber and R.H Tawney can be easily 
integrated into what is otherwise a standard growth model. 
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